Social factors are associated with a wide variety of health outcomes. Social epidemiology has successfully used the traditional methods of surveillance and description to establish consistent relations between social factors and health status. Epidemiology as an etiologic science, however, has been largely ineffective in moving toward causal explanations for these observed patterns. Using the counterfactual approach to causal inference, the authors describe several fundamental problems that often arise when researchers seek to infer explanatory mechanisms from data on social factors. Contrasts that form standard causal effect estimates require implicit unobserved (counterfactual) quantities, because observational data provide only one exposure state for each individual. Although application of counterfactual arguments has successfully advanced etiologic understanding in other observational settings, the particular nature of social factors often leads to logical contradictions or misleading inferences when investigators fail to clearly articulate the counterfactual contrasts that are implied. For example, because social factors are often attributes of individuals and are components of structured social relations, random assignment is not plausible even as a hypothetical experiment, making typical epidemiologic contrasts inappropriate and the inference equivocal at best. Accordingly, more deliberate and creative approaches to causal inference in social epidemiology are required. Infectious disease epidemiology and systems analysis provide examples of approaches to causal inference that can be used when statistical mimicry of simple experimental designs is not tenable. In an era of increasing social inequality, valid approaches for the study of social factors and health are needed more urgently than ever. Am J Epidemiol 1999;150:113-20. causality; confounding factors (epidemiology); epidemiologic methods; observation; social class; social conditions Editor's note: An invited commentary on this paper appears on page 121, and the authors' response on page 127.
has emerged over the last 2>-A decades as a distinctly recognized specialization within epidemiology (1, 2) . The term "social factors" could certainly be broadly construed to apply in varying degrees to every conceivable exposure, since human lives are inextricably bound within the context of social relations and culture. In this sense, all epidemiology is "social" epidemiology, and the distinction is really made only by the extent to which investigators make explicit reference to the underlying social determinants of disease (3) . Our conceptualization of these underlying social factors is generally related to one of the three primary axes of contemporary social stratification: race, gender, and class (4) . Each of these dimensions has in turn been approached in myriad ways, reflecting the complex pathways through which they are thought to affect or determine exposures, behaviors, physical constitu-tion, and other direct or contributory causes of disease (5) . Class, for example, is most often studied under the Weberian rubric of "socioeconomic status," which is frequently operationalized as income, education, occupation, or some combination of these measures (6) .
There can no longer be any disagreement about the importance of "social factors" for health outcomes; the persistent documentation of these patterns for a wide variety of outcomes is inarguably a significant achievement of public health science (5, 7) . Where social epidemiology has largely failed, however, is in explaining these patterns-using observations to construct a theoretical causal mechanism which links the exposures and outcomes and which is subject to refutation through further observation. Although this is frequently stated as a research goal in studies of social factors, the promise remains largely unfulfilled. It can be argued, of course, that epidemiology in general is often more successful at documenting an association between exposure and disease than at using this observation to determine the causal mechanism (8, 9) . However, social epidemiology has been especially frustrated in this regard. A reason for this impasse, we contend, is that the traditional epidemiologic method is ill-suited for considering social quantities as risk factors. Our goal is not to denigrate research on social factors but rather to encourage a more thoughtful methodology that will be more likely to provide valid inference, and thereby the basis for scientific understanding and sound policy recommendations.
Causality in observational epidemiology
The present foundation for theories of causal association and noncausal association (confounding) in observational epidemiology draws heavily from the counterfactual model of causation, popularized in the statistical literature by Rubin (10) and Rosenbaum (11) . The work of Greenland and Robins (12, 13) , for example, utilizes counterfactual reasoning extensively. Although alternative definitions of confounding have been advanced in the literature (14, 15) , only the counterfactual model has spawned a consistent body of theoretical literature in epidemiology. Although a brief summary of this model follows, readers seeking a more complete and lucid description are referred to Holland (16, 17) , from which the following material was abstracted.
We can define two functions to refer to dichotomous exposure and disease occurrence at the individual (unit) level, an exposure function 5 and an outcome function Y. For unit u in population U, S(u) = e if u is exposed and S(u) = c if u is unexposed. Whereas the 5 function takes only one argument (a given unit u is either exposed or unexposed), the Y function must take two arguments, since outcome depends both on the unit u and on the exposure status s.
Y(u, s) =
1 if, were u to be exposed to condition s, u would develop disease; 0 if, were u to be exposed to condition s, u would not develop disease.
We (18) . The meaning of "closest" in this context is not entirely clear, but it presumably denotes an alternate reality in which all factors not affected by the exposure are identical, unit u is the same individual, and only the exposure status differs (19) .
The advantage of the counterfactual approach for epidemiology is that it can be used to provide unambiguous causal parameters. For example, the difference Y e (u) -Y c (u) equals 1 if e is the cause of disease, -1 if e is protective against disease, and 0 if e is irrelevant to causation of disease. At a population level, we actually seek the "average causal effect" (ACE)-the average of all individual-level effects. That is,
Restricting ACE to the exposed population by conditioning on exposure yields 
This is what epidemiologists refer to as the risk difference. One should note immediately that P{Y C -115 = e) can never be directly observed, because it is counterfactual (i.e., the probability of disease in the exposed that would have occurred had they not been exposed). Although the ACE is ultimately the parameter of interest (the true risk difference among the exposed), what we are forced to measure instead is the "prima facie average causal effect" (FACE):
This sleight of hand, the calculation of the FACE in place of the ACE, is the foundation of the "epidemiologic method" for observational studies: We use the observable outcome in the unexposed group in place of the unobservable outcome in the exposed group. The assumption that FACE = ACE is true if and only if
The fundamental definition of confounding in epidemiology is that this assumption is not met, and that FACE * ACE (12) . Another way to put this is that Y c is associated with S, which Rosenbaum (11) and Rubin (10) refer to as nonignorability of the treatment assignment. Randomization guarantees that FACE approaches ACE as n goes to infinity, since exposure is applied without regard to any other factors that might influence outcome (13) . In observational studies, however, we generally assume that FACE * ACE because units are exposed differentially with respect to other factors, and so we adjust for these factors. The goal of adjustment is to control for confounding, which means establishing equivalence between FACE and ACE. This only happens when, conditioned on the confounding variables, P(Y C -IIS = c) = P{Y c = IIS = e). That is, after adjustment, the conditional probability of disease in the unexposed must equal the conditional probability of disease that would have occurred in the exposed, had they been unexposed. The direct verification of this counterfactual statement is never possible, of course, which is one reason why the interpretation of observational studies remains problematic (20) . However, the logical interpretation of the counterfactual statement must be sensible and its validity should at least be plausible (e.g., subject to indirect confirmation) for analyses to have any credibility or utility. We believe that it is at this critical juncture that social epidemiology has faltered.
Attributes as causes
As an example of the application of the epidemiologic method to social factors, consider the problem of racial differences in health outcomes. The health gap between US Blacks and Whites has elicited consider-. able attention in social epidemiology, especially the question of the extent to which this gap results from differences in socioeconomic status variables, such as income, education, occupation, community-level characteristics, and so forth (21) . Numerous analyses have been conducted for a wide variety of outcomes, some of which found that adjustment for social class and other confounders "closed the gap" and thus "explained" the observed Black-White discrepancy (22) , while others found that the groups maintained a difference with regard to the outcome even after adjustment for covariates (23) . Inference has been based on the adjusted causal parameter (e.g., risk ratio) as an estimate of the effect that would have occurred if the two groups had equivalent distributions of covariates. If we state this counterfactual argument carefully, however, we find that it engenders a number of logical and interpretative problems (24) .
Where X represents any number of covariates (confounders), this analysis strategy is based on the assumption that FACE = ACE, conditioned on X-i.e., that
In the case of Black-White comparisons, where Blacks are the "exposed" group (an interesting notion in itself, but one implicit in these analyses), the right-hand side of this equation is the counterfactual state that corresponds to the conditional probability of the outcome among Blacks that would have occurred if they had not been Black. Based on the structure of this analytical design, if they had not been Black, they would have been White. Even leaving aside the question of whether racial "Whiteness" is the absence of "Blackness," the logic of this analysis quickly falls apart. On a philosophical level, if the exposure is an attribute of u, we cannot contemplate the same unit in the unexposed state. That is, a Black person who is not Black cannot be considered to be the same person; likewise for sex, year of birth, or any other unalterable characteristic of a unit (25, 26) . Although one might ponder the meaning of "unalterable" in light of sex-change operations and arbitrary racial classification schema, these types of analyses remain uninterpretable regardless. The person who undergoes surgical sex change has not experienced the same lifelong environment (social, hormonal, psychological, etc.) as someone who was born a member of the other sex. Similarly, although some persons socially recognized as Black may choose to redefine themselves as White, that does not make them exchangeable with respect to all relevant experiences and characteristics with persons who have been socially recognized throughout their lives as White.
On a practical level, what finite set of covariates X are identifiable that could logically make Blacks and Whites exchangeable? Even if we adjusted for education, psychosocial stressors, environmental toxins, and so on, would we not also have to consider parental and ancestral characteristics, sociocultural heritage, and other historical conditions that have shaped the contemporary notion of "Black" identity (24)? A growing body of work comparing native and foreignborn Blacks in the United States, for example, suggests that cultural orientation and self-identity influence epidemiologic outcomes (27) . How could one ever hope to condition on these complex and historically dependent psychosocial factors in a way that would make Blacks and Whites interchangeable with respect to all exposures, behaviors, beliefs, and constitutional factors that bear on disease outcomes? More importantly, even if one did postulate that conditioning on an identified set of covariates would make Blacks and Whites exchangeable with respect to a given outcome, how could the validity of this proposition ever be tested? Because there exists no logical counterfactual state (i.e., Blacks who are not exposed to Blackness), there can never be any evaluation of the assumption that FACE = ACE. Any estimated value of a causal parameter for race (or sex or any other attribute) will therefore be uninterpretable.
So far from random
Of the three primary dimensions of social stratification-race, gender, and class-at least class has the potential for modification, and therefore seems a more reasonable candidate for the epidemiologic method. One could debate this by pointing out the dependence of an individual's early environment on his or her parents' class (28) , but at least in the case of many socioeconomic status exposures there exists a logical counterfactual: If unit u has an annual income of $20,000, for example, we might reasonably contemplate the outcome u could expect with an income of $40,000. Similarly, one could imagine the same individual living in a different neighborhood, exposed to a different educational program, placed in a different occupation, and so forth.
As with much of epidemiology, we are limited in the examination of socioeconomic factors to observational studies, because although we can imagine manipulation of a socioeconomic status variable, it is a practical impossibility to apply this to humans in an experimental setting. As described above, we therefore use the outcome in the unexposed group as a surrogate for the unobserved outcome in the exposed group by conditioning on those covariates that we believe to be associated with exposure assignment. That is, we use FACE in place of ACE (as shown in equation 4) in order to estimate the causal effect of e. The stratification on or adjustment for covariates X is intended to mimic for us the results that we would have been able to observe had we been able to randomize units to different socioeconomic status exposure levels and directly observe the causal effect of the factor of interest. The logic of this epidemiologic strategy is entirely dependent on the assumption that, conditioned on X, the exposure assignment s is independent of the outcome in the unexposed, Y c . We noted above that this has been referred to as "ignorability" of the exposure assignment (11), but it is also related to what Rubin described as the "stability assumption" (10, 26) . Briefly, the stability assumption requires that the value of Y s (u)\X be the same no matter how u came to be exposed or unexposed, which implies two very strong conditions: 1) exposure must be identical for every unit (i.e., there are not several versions of the exposure) and 2) the outcome in any given unit M, is independent of the outcome in any other unit u y
For analyses of social factors, even those socioeconomic status variables that may have definable counterfactuals, these basic assumptions for application of the epidemiologic method are not met. It could certainly be argued that these conditions are, in fact, seldom met in any epidemiologic study, but the nature of social exposures, we assert, makes the violations of these assumptions particularly extreme. For example, the requirement of stable exposure effects would not be realistic for education, where quality is highly correlated with community wealth and tax structure (29) ; for income, because of systematic differences in the costs of basic necessities, such as housing, food, and transportation, which are required to maintain good health (30); or for occupation, because of systematic differences in workplace conditions such as local regulations or age of facilities (31) . Although improved measurement of these subtle distinctions in exposure could potentially reduce bias, the prospects of actually approaching the stability assumption are slight, because inequality is pervasive and multidimensional (32) ; no matter what finite set of factors we condition on, substantial inequality in other unmeasured factors is likely to remain (33) . Knowledge of the complex social mechanisms that reproduce inequality would be required for an analysis that attempted to identify the causal effect of a single factor, yet it is exactly the specification of this complex structure that is the longrange goal of social epidemiology.
Another serious violation of these basic premises arises because for social exposures (as for infectious agents), the outcome for unit u i is not independent of the outcome for w ; (34 unexposed. For example, one hypothesized pathway through which status measures are thought to induce chronic disease is the experience of stress (35) and the resultant use of coping behaviors (e.g., cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption) that increase the probability of the disease outcome (36) . However, the exact manifestation of the coping behavior pathway is shaped to a large extent by elements in the social environment, such as the behavior of family members (37) . This creates, in effect, multiple versions of the exposure, and an association between the outcomes of individuals who share social connections. Although this is sometimes mentioned in conceptual models and in articles' discussion sections, we are not aware of any data analysis that has attempted to accommodate these dependencies. Virtually all standard statistical techniques, which are based on the assumption that observations are independent and identically distributed, are inappropriate for such data.
Pedantism versus pragmatism
All statistical modeling is a compromise between inconvenient truth and useful fiction: There is probably no real exposure-disease relation with an exactly logistic form, or with time-dependent hazards that are exactly proportional, for example. The body of methodological critique in epidemiology warning of violated assumptions and potential biases is therefore often met with a seasoned indifference; what matters is not that a model be "true" (for it most assuredly never is) but rather whether, by temporarily investing belief in the model, we can arrive at the correct scientific inference (38) . It is not really our concern, therefore, that counterfactual models in social epidemiology so often violate the logical premises of the method. Rather, our concern is that they violate these premises so extremely that little or no useful inference is gleaned. At best, misapplication of the epidemiologic method to these problems can leave us where we started, and at worst, it can lead to conclusions that are mistaken and potentially damaging. For example, the enormous body of medical and epidemiologic literature declaring evidence of innate racial predispositions to hypertension, low birth weight, and other outcomes is based almost entirely on inappropriate counterfactual arguments, and falls into the latter category (39) .
Infectious disease epidemiologists have provided examples of how one can achieve valid counterfactual contrasts at the group level when interunit dependencies prevent the valid application of the epidemiologic method at the individual level, thus moving beyond any pretense of stable unit exposure toward a methodology that accounts for interrelations between units and for the processes that influence collective risk (34, 40) . Social factors are also clearly "infectious" in that they involve the relations of people to one another and to social institutions (families, communities, governments, etc.). We transmit education from parent to child, and socially through the institution of schooling. We transmit income to one another through commodity transfer, and socially through the institution of work. Just as community levels of infectious agents affect the transmission probabilities for individuals (41) , the social and economic characteristics of communities affect the transmission of education, income, and other social factors that bear on disease outcomes (42) . Why then should social epidemiology continue to embrace a toxicologic model of risk based on a concept of "independent effects" that is clearly inappropriate (43)? It is now common practice in social epidemiology to adjust for multiple social factors when attempting to isolate the "independent" effect of some single measure (44) . Examinations of income effects are routinely adjusted for education and other factors, for example, and failure to do so has been met in our experience with reviewer complaints that "important sources of confounding were not controlled." But given the existence of a social structure that conditions the relations between the variables (i.e., an economic system that reproduces labor, a racial caste system that reproduces inequality, etc.), what is the possible meaning of an "independent" effect of income? In the experimental and counterfactual models, it is the causal effect associated with a change in that exposure while all other conditions are held constant. However, in this world, where real people live, those other factors are not held constant-they vary and interact in particular, structured ways that reflect the organization of society. People with a given income value did not arrive at that value through a randomization process or anything remotely close to it; rather, they arrived at the observed value through a dynamic life trajectory that was shaped by an organized context of institutions and social relations. There can be no meaningful interpretation of an "independent" effect in this setting, since it does not correspond to any consequence of exposure that can be isolated from the mechanism of treatment assignment.
Alternative strategies for progress
Our concerns about the limitations of counterfactual methods for etiologic work on social factors may be misinterpreted by some epidemiologists as a form of "nihilism." We consider the study of social factors to be among the most important epidemiologic projects of our time; arguments against a particular set of methods should not be misconstrued as an attack on the research agenda itself. We emphasize, therefore, that we believe the relations between social factors and diseases can and should be studied, and that valid insights gained from this endeavor can potentially influence social policy and improve the public health. However, if the traditional epidemiologic method for observational studies is generally invalid for these exposures, how can we realistically proceed if we are not to abandon causal inference entirely? We identify here three potentially advantageous alternative strategies for progress in social epidemiology.
Seek causal explanations only for definable interventions. The epidemiologic method for making causal inference in observational research is based on mimicking experimental trials in which the treatment is assigned randomly. In light of the underlying logic of this method, it may therefore only be appropriate to define causal effects for factors that are plausibly assigned as treatments in hypothetical experiments, even if these are not practical or ethical to conduct. By this restriction, there is no definable causal effect of attributes such as race or sex, although there are definable effects of interest for racism and sexism. Although an experimental trial in which a racist incident is randomly applied to some (Black) subjects is not practical, it is also not logically impossible. Nonetheless, it would never be possible to describe what proportion of the observed Black-White difference in outcome was due to racism through the epidemiologic method, since this implies a counterfactual equality between Blacks and Whites in the absence of all exposure differences; the only defined counterfactual is between Blacks exposed to some aspect of racism and Blacks unexposed. Because it is impossible to define the finite set of variables that would make Blacks and Whites exchangeable (i.e., conditioning on this set of variables would make racial assignment random), it is likewise impossible to define the proportion of the Black-White difference that is accounted for by any enumerated set of measured factors.
A limitation of this recommendation is that although it addresses the logical problem of attributes as causes, it does not solve the problems of ignorability of treatment assignment and unit stability which are fundamental to social epidemiology. For example, poverty represents the opportunity for a definable intervention. We can therefore logically estimate a causal effect of poverty and use this estimate to predict change of outcome in response to social intervention-for example, the effect of poverty on mortality (45) . The problem, as described above, is that no matter how realistically complete the covariate set, the prediction based on standard techniques is not likely to approximate the results of an actual intervention. That is, we expect that the causal effect estimate obtained using standard techniques would be inevitably and substantively biased. Sensitivity techniques (20, 46) , which are underutilized in social epidemiology, can help in evaluating the role of unobserved factors as alternative explanations to ordinal inferences and in adjusting bounds on causal estimates, but we suspect that for most analyses of social factors, the quantity of information missing in any real data set would be sufficient to make these bounds unacceptably wide.
Redefine effects of interest to satisfy stability requirements. The problem of interunit dependency, although not widely appreciated in social epidemiology, is increasingly a focus of methodologies for the study of infectious disease. If we accept that social processes are transmitted between individuals and that an intervention outcome for any unit is therefore dependent on the states of other units in the population, then infectious disease epidemiology is the logical point of departure for an improved methodology for social factors (34, 40) . Thus, in analogy with infectious processes, we can redefine parameters of interest to accommodate indirect effects, such as the effect on unit w, of an intervention on unit u p where M ( . and Uj share a social relationship (37); population risk is not simply a summarization of individual risks, because of indirect effects that operate through unit interdependencies. "Ecologic effects" (42) , for example, can be seen as analogous to "herd immunity"; populations that enjoy collective social health (e.g., an egalitarian distribution of incomes) indirectly confer this protection to individual units through a lower probability of encountering deleterious behaviors, antagonistic social relations, and so forth (32) .
The problem for social epidemiologists seeking to apply infectious disease techniques to their research is that although a thoroughly delineated theory of infectious disease transmission has been articulated, based on the nature and behavior of infectious agents and immunologic responses (47) , no comparable body of quantitative work describes the admittedly more complex social interactions within human populations that might underlie race, gender, and social class effects. The crucial role of theory in the evaluation of epidemiologic hypotheses has been stressed by social epidemiologists (48) , and to this end the field has proven energetic in articulating the biologic, social, and economic foundations of race, gender, social class, and related quantities of interest (5) . The field has been less productive, however, in the development of a similarly rigorous body of theoretical work on the quantitative and structural analysis of social interactions, which would underlie any analysis accommodating interunit dependencies. Some preliminary work along these lines has appeared within the field of sociology (49) , but as yet we know of no application of this type of scholarship to the problems confronting social epidemiology.
Model what we observe, not what we can't observe. Using the epidemiologic method, the quantity being sought from an adjustment procedure is that unobserved effect which would presumably be observed, conditioned on some specified covariates, X. Ultimately, the validity of the causal estimate is unverifiable because it is based not on the relations that occur in our world, but rather on those that pertain in an imaginary world in which X takes the specific values x. Rather than try to labor toward an incrementally better approximation of a world that we ultimately can't observe, the alternative strategy is to labor progressively toward our world. That is, rather than starting with the observed data and moving away toward the unobservable, one starts with an abstract model and a clear depiction of the observed relation, and tries to move progressively from the former to the latter. This is the strategy inherent in a "systems" approach to epidemiology (50) .
In practice, this means that we first quantify the joint distributions of measured exposures and outcomes, rather than outcomes that would be predicted under numerous unrealistic or unverifiable assumptions. In as many dimensions as one can comfortably make sense of, and perhaps with the aid of some smoothing algorithm, one asks, "What does the relation actually look like!" Once the outcome surface is well described along a number of dimensions, the obvious question that follows is, "What process could have generated such a configuration of data?" At this point, the epidemiologist must integrate biologic knowledge of the outcome with sociologic and economic knowledge of the exposures to postulate a system that could have operated to configure the data as they were observed (51) .
The more detailed the observations of patterns of data in the real world, the more complex (and hopefully realistic) the proposed model can become. Similarly, the more elaborate the model, the more specific the predictions that can be made. These predictions can then be compared with future observations to judge how well the hypothetical system approaches the behavior of the real-world system (11) . This interactive process of comparing the behavior of a model with that of the real world would seem to be the most secure starting point in a search for "explanations" for the observed relations. Any chosen model is subject to continual refinement, and may, admittedly, be absolutely incorrect while still generating patterns of outcomes that mimic the real-world data. The advantage, however, is that one strives toward an observed rather than an unobserved goal: The observed relation is the ultimate end, and new predictions based on the model that correspond to fresh observation are evidence in favor of its veracity.
Infectious disease epidemiologists have pioneered this approach, and the success of this form of inference-for example, in identifying the role of the primary infection period in human immunodeficiency virus transmission (52)-shows that its application can be enormously fruitful. Similarly useful results may await social epidemiologists if tools that accommodate the structural logic and complexity of the factors under study are applied.
